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Trade Costs and Deviations from the Law of One Price
The law of one price (LOP) simply states that in a market free of tariffs, transportation costs, and other trade impediments, identical products sell for the same common-currency price in different countries. Price equalization is brought about by goods market arbitrage, but trade policy barriers and transportation costs would drive a wedge between prices in different countries with the size of the wedge depending on the tradability of the good (Rogoff 1996, p.649) .
Though apparently simple, the LOP raises a number of theoretical and empirical issues. There is an extensive literature aimed at testing the validity of the LOP. Large and persistent deviations from the LOP are well documented in this literature. However, as Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004, p.737 ) point out, this literature still lacks a theoretical foundation necessary to link evidence on relative prices across countries to trade barriers.
Most empirical tests are based on an arbitrage equation, known in the literature as
Heckscher's commodity points (HCP), which has very limited relevance to understanding the link between price differentials and trade costs. They show that in a general equilibrium setup arbitrage will generally lead to price differentials that are much tighter than that implied by the HCP. On the other hand, deviations from the LOP may be persistently larger than the marginal cost of moving the good from one place to the other, mainly due to market imperfections 1 .
Therefore, it matters to know the different possible origins (local of production) and destinations (local of consumption), in a general equilibrium setup, to identify who the possible arbitrageurs are and which trade costs are relevant to relative prices between each pair of locations. To our knowledge, none of the empirical studies on the LOP 1 Imperfections such as monopoly power, imperfect information, and long-term customer-seller relationships, among others, limit the ability of wholesalers to arbitrage price differences. Indeed, in the presence of exclusive national marketing licences, arbitrage costs may be prohibitive for wholesalers. In practice, goods are never identical. To the extent that there is some degree of product differentiation, the cost of arbitrage tend to rise further relatively to the marginal cost of moving the good from one place to the other. Goldberg and Verboven (2001) provide evidence on how small differences in products due to regulatory constraints have limited arbitrage in the European car market.
considers a general equilibrium setup and very few have direct measures of trade costs even for bilateral trade 2 .
Anderson and Van Wincoop also show that ad-valorem trade costs tend to be quite large, though it is very hard to estimate them with current available data, especially when they include border-related trade barriers and local distributional costs 3 . Therefore, although price differentials between spatially separated markets may often be persistently large, we do not really know how much of these differentials can be explained by trade costs and by other factors.
The fact of the matter is that relative prices of similar products sold in different countries have been shown to be systematically related to exchange rate fluctuations between those countries for a variety of goods and countries (Goldberg and Knetter 1997, p.1248) . For example, Engel and Rogers (1996) show that retail price dispersion increases with the distance between city pairs, but goes much beyond distance when cities are in different countries. More recently, Engel and Rogers (2001) find large border effects that are unrelated to trade barriers, but may be explained by exchange rate volatility combined with nominal price stickiness. Parsley and Wei (2001) also find strong evidence of sticky prices in local currency. Furthermore, distance, shipping cost, and exchange rate variability collectively explain a large portion of the border effect between the U.S. and Japan.
These studies suffer from the already mentioned inappropriate use of HCP. Since we know the locations where goods are sold, but do not know where they can possibly come from, the relevant trade costs for arbitrage are unknown. Given that resale of goods at retail prices tends to be rather costly, arbitrage may be done by producers in other locations, making trade cost between places of consumption irrelevant to explain price differentials. Besides, distance between pairs of consumption locations may not be a good proxy for transport costs, even when constant costs per unit of distance are added 4 .
Transport costs depend on several other factors such as the specific good being transported, mode of transportation, volumes being transported, traffic congestion, toll fees, and shippers' market power. The latter depends on the number of shipping firms, the elasticity of demand, product prices, and import tariffs (Hummels, Lugovskyy and
Skiba 2008).
At the retail level it is difficult to satisfy the condition of identical goods 5 . However, using wholesale prices or international trade unit values, many studies have also rejected the LOP for narrowly defined and highly tradable goods. The LOP is rejected for some homogeneous commodities according to early empirical studies (Isard 1977; Richardson 1978; Kravis and Lipsey 1978) . More recently, Thursby, Johnson and Grennes (1986) , Giovannini (1988) , Knetter (1989 and 1993 ), and Ceglowski (1994 , among others, have also provided evidence against the LOP for homogeneous highly disaggregated goods.
They all reveal persistent short-run deviations from the LOP 6 . Cointegration-based LOP tests seem to provide more support for the hypothesis. Conceptually, they see price equalization as a long-term equilibrium, but the speed of convergence can be analyzed through a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) as, for instance, in Vataja (2000) and Michael, Nobay and Peel (1994) . On the other hand, cointegration analyses by Ardeni (1989) and Baffes (1991) find mixed results for the same narrowly defined goods.
Although most studies recognize the spatial dimension, they fail to take into account the crucial role of time in the process of arbitrage. Since the transportation of goods takes time, arbitrage does not occur directly between current prices, but between forward prices for delivery in a future date. Protopapadakis and Stoll (1983 and ) use futures market prices and find support for the LOP. Since these tests on wholesale prices and trade unit 4 Parsley and Wei (2001) estimate the cost per unit of distance between the US and Japan on the basis of the bilateral and proportional difference between c.i.f. and f.o.b. unit values. The intra-national cost per unit of distance is somewhat arbitrarily assumed to be half of the international cost. 5 Haskel and Wolf (2001) and Asplund and Friberg (2001) , among others, have very creatively managed to maintain the identical goods assumption at the retail level. Both studies reject the LOP, though some convergence tends to occur over time. 6 As time series data on prices tend to be non-stationary, conventional regressions applied in some early studies are invalid.
values do not generally control for any other variable, they do not account for any deviation from the LOP 7 .
Our analysis differs from the previous literature in two main aspects. Firstly, we derive theoretical arbitrage equations, relating international relative prices to international trade costs for highly traded homogeneous commodities, considering different models of competition and lag effects in a general equilibrium framework. These arbitrage equations provide the theoretical foundation necessary to relate deviations from the LOP to trade costs. Secondly, our empirical tests examine the world trade of tin by looking simultaneously at the two main importing countries, the United States and Japan, and the major exporting countries, providing a multi-country framework. C.i.f. and f.o.b. monthly unit values in five different entry ports in the United States allow a direct measure of trade costs and the necessary data to test their relation with price differentials. The border effect between the U.S. and Japan can also be directly estimated. By focusing on the international portion of transportation and on a homogeneous commodity free of policy barriers, we avoid the difficulties associated with measuring border-related trade policy barriers, local distributional costs, and local markups.
LOP deviations are found to be as small between the U.S. and Japan as between locations pairs in the United States. Thus no border effect is found for cross-country c.i.f.
unit values. The speed of convergence to the LOP has half-lives that vary from one to four months, the fastest in the literature. Hence, LOP deviations are never persistently large. In contrast, studies that use aggregate price indices, such as the consumer price index, find half-lives of 36 to 60 months for the speed of convergence of real exchange rates. Asplund and Friberg (2001) estimate a half-life of 24 months for the speed of adjustment in the prices of products sold in the Scandinavian duty-free outlets. Studies that focus on individual retail goods across countries find LOP deviations persistency with half-lives in the range of 12 to 24 months. This is the range found in Crucini and Shintani (2008) , who find that the speed of adjustment depends on the degree of 7 The article by Michael, Nobay and Peel (1994) is one of the exceptions, because they explicitly consider shipping costs from exporting to importing countries. They show that the LOP cannot be rejected in the tradability of the goods and their inputs, being faster the lower the distribution margin.
Half-lives of relative price deviations for automobiles in Europe are estimated in the range of 16 to 19 months by Goldberg and Verboven (2005) , while Cumby (1996) Obstfeld and Taylor 1997) . HCP implicitly consider that arbitrage between markets i and j is carried out by wholesalers or consumers through the resale of the good from one market to the other. However, if arbitrage is carried out by producers or exporters, then price differentials will generally be smaller than trade costs (Anderson and Van Wincoop 2004, p.738) . Let us review this important point now.
Abstracting from markups, taxes and subsidies in the chain from production to the final user and assuming that the price paid by the buyer is given by the marginal cost of production (c m ) in exporting country m times the trade cost (t mi ) from m to i, we can write long-run and although there are systematic short-run deviations from the LOP, they cannot be predicted exante, hence, no arbitrage opportunity is left unexploited. 
A Simple General Equilibrium Model of Arbitrage
In developing this theoretical model of arbitrage, what we have in mind is a traded homogeneous metal commodity whose world reference price is negotiated at commodity and futures markets such as the London Metal Exchange (LME). Our main goal is to find the implications for the relationship between trade costs and relative price under different sets of basic conditions. Let us start by making a set of assumptions designed to establish a model in which arbitrage could work as perfectly as possible: (a) the world market is made up of many importing markets in different locations and of some exporting countries with, at least, a few firms in each country; (b) exporters decide the total quantity they want to sell on the basis of a reference spot price negotiated at a world commodity market. As a result, supply in each exporting country is fixed at any point in time 10 ; (c) the demand in each of the importing countries is a continuous function and is negatively related to the commodity price; (d) competition is fierce in some large importing markets, so that exporters and shippers take destination price (c.i.f.) as given in these markets; and (e) in these large and competitive markets, exporters also take as given the price of moving the commodity from the exporting country to the importing
. Although every single shipper takes destination price as given, this assumption does not preclude the possibility that shippers may actually force exporters to sell at marginal cost or share profits with them in these routes.
As a result of these assumptions, the sole problem for the exporting firm is to distribute its sales among the different importing markets, so as to maximize its instantaneous profits. Let us consider two of these large and competitive importing markets (i and j). Buyers in importing countries always source for the lowest price, while sellers seek for highest prices 11 . Hence, the price (c.i.f.) of this homogeneous commodity at a particular time and destination is expected to be the same, regardless of its origin.
Likewise, the price (f.o.b.) of this commodity at a particular time and origin is expected to be the same independently of its destination. In other words, neither importers nor exporters can price discriminate. International trade costs are given and are known to both importers and exporters. Relative prices between different locations at a point in time are here constrained not by a bilateral relationship between one importer and one exporter, but by a general equilibrium version of arbitrage in which there are several potential exporters/origins and importers/destinations. We would like to focus first on an instantaneous equilibrium situation, in which each destination is supplied by at least two different exporting countries, and at least one exporting country supplies both destinations at the same time with equal shipping times.
Proposition: if the above conditions hold, then the following non-arbitrage condition must also hold for any exporter m that sells to both locations i and j at the same time:
(1) log(p* j )-log(p* i ) = log(t mj )-log(t mi )
where p* i and p* j are the prices for which demand equals supply in importing countries i and j; t mi and t mj are one plus the trade costs, including shipping firms' profits if any, from m to i and j, respectively 12 . In other words, proportional price differentials between two importing countries are determined by the exporter (arbitrageur) that sells to both locations, and are equal to the proportional difference between the two destinations of the trade costs from this exporting country. log(p* mj )-log(p* mi )=log(t mj )-log(t mi ). Since importers pay the lowest price for the product that is expected to arrive at each destination at the same time, regardless of country of origin, then p* mi =p* i and p* mj =p* j . Therefore, log(p* j )-log(p* i )=log(t mj )-log(t mi ).
Corollary: under the above conditions, if the trade cost of an exporting country z to destination i, where price is lower, is at least as high or higher than to destination j, then z will only export to j, where price is higher, and the trade cost difference between the two destinations of this exporter will be either zero or will have the opposite sign to the trade cost differentials of the arbitrageur to the same destinations.
Proof: p* i <p* j and, for exporting country z, t zi ≥t zj . From p* i <p* j it follows that c z .(1+r zi ).t zi <c z .(1+r zj ).t zj if z could export to i and j; but since t zi ≥t zj then c z .r zi =Π zi <c z .r zj =Π zj . Therefore, country z will only supply importing country j. Since t zi ≥t zj then log(t zj )-log(t zi )≤0, but since p* i <p* j then log(t mj )-log(t mi )>0.
Let us now assume that an exporting firm at country m is a price taker when exporting to destination i, but is a monopoly when exporting to destination j. In other words, the cost (c.i.f.) of the product shipped to j by the second most efficient exporter is prohibitive. We initially assume that the exporting firm in m can extract all profits so that trade costs from m to i and from m to j include no profits. Therefore, given t mi , the exporting firm will maximize profits where p* i /t mi (the fob price) equals its marginal cost mc(x). Profits must be non-negative for m to be an exporter to i. The exporting firm total supply (x*) is thus determined by this profit maximization. When exporting to j, the monopolist firm will then equate its marginal revenue to its marginal cost. That is: max (p* j /t mj ).x mj -(p* i /t mi ).x mj with respect to x mj . The first order condition will give:
(p* j /t mj ).
(1-1/|ε|)=(p* i /t mi ). Thus, the proportional price difference between the two destinations will now be:
(2) log(p* j )-log(p* i ) = log(t mj )-log(t mi )-log(1-1/|ε|) Therefore, monopoly in one destination market widens price differentials compared to other destinations, independently of trade costs differentials. Note that the same result will be obtained if shipping firms take the fob price in m as given, but while they are confronted with a perfectly elastic demand curve in i, there is a monopoly service from m to j 14 . However, in this case, f.o.b. price differentials will be equal to zero, while it will be different from zero if the exporter is a monopolist.
Clearly, if the cost (c.i.f.) of the product shipped to j by the second most efficient exporter from country z is lower than the monopoly price of the good from m, the monopolist can practice limit pricing in the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, thereby driving the rival from the market. We will then have:
That is, price differentials will be in between the competitive case and the full monopolist case. Market power implies that only one exporter will sell in the market at a point in time.
Let us now consider some lag effects. Suppose that, giving shipping times from an exporter m to destinations i and j, price and trade cost have to be settled one period earlier for buyers in i than in j, for the good to arrive at the same time: p* jm (t) = p m (t-1).t mj (t-1) and p* im (t) = p m (t-2).t mi (t-2), where p m is the f.o.b. price at m. Thus,
Current price differentials between two destinations that buy from the same exporter depend now on the changes over time in f.o.b. prices and in trade costs of the exporter. Consider a second exporter z that only ships to destination j. If it takes longer for z's product to arrive at j than m's product, importers at j will buy from z if they expect, based on information at the time Ω(t-k), when they buy from z, the c.i.f. price from m at (t-1) to be higher than the c.i.f. price from z at (t-k): E[p m (t-1).t mj (t-1)| Ω(t-k)]>p z (tk).t zj (t-k). But if they do not know how c.i.f. prices will change from (t-k) to (t-1), they might split their purchases between the two countries. The result is that the c.i.f. price differentials at one destination from different exporting countries will no longer be zero.
Data and Methodological Strategy
Tin appears to be an appropriate product to test our model of arbitrage for homogeneous commodities. Alongside copper, tin was the first metal to be traded on the London Metal Exchange (LME) and it is specified, among other things, that the product must be of 99.85% minimum purity. Although most LME contracts do not include the physical sale of the product, it seems that almost all non-alloyed tin imported in large markets satisfy this LME standard 15 . Therefore, non-alloyed tin is likely to be one of the most homogenous tradable commodities, though small quality differences remain.
The international market for non-alloyed tin has two large importing countries: the 
Results
Let us start by analyzing unit values at each location from different countries of origin.
The objective of the next subsection is to test the LOP at a point in space and gather information that will be useful to the analysis of spatially separated markets.
C.i.f. Unit Value Differentials at one location from different countries of origin
Baltimore (BA) has been the main port of entry into the U.S., accounting for 61% of total deviations are not persistent. In point of fact, c.i.f. deviations are never greater than 5% or smaller than -5% for more than two consecutive months over this whole 19-year period.
Due to the number of missing observations, it is not possible to replicate the above time series analysis for the data of NY, NO, LA and SF. States. Considering these means of the absolute values in each destination, larger deviations are never persistent since they never last for more than three months in any of the series. Bearing in mind that we are considering just the two main exporters at each destination port, we take this measurement error as largely accounted for the fact that monthly unit values are being used instead of daily actual (forward) prices. Daily forward price differentials at a single destination from different exporters tend to be larger, the smaller and less frequent the shipments are. Therefore, these differentials tend to be smaller when only the two main exporters are being considered, since they tend to ship larger quantities with higher frequency. These error measurements will be useful as a reference in comparison with LOP deviations between different destinations. In any case, we may conclude that LOP deviations for the two main exporters are neither large nor persistent at any particular port of destination.
Assuming Japan is small enough to be spatially considered a single destination, the last column of table 1 provides some basic descriptive statistics for the series of the c.i.f.
unit value differentials between the two main exporters to Japan. Note that the standard deviation and the mean of the absolute value of the deviations for the two main exporters are even lower than in BA. This seems to reflect greater regularity in terms of frequency and quantities shipped by each of the main exporting countries to Japan. ADF tests reveal that both the time series of c.i.f. unit values are non-stationary, while the difference is stationary. We cannot reject the hypothesis that there is one cointegrating equation between the two variables. Applying VECM and imposing the restriction (1,-1) on the coefficients, the standard error indicates that the intercept is not significant and the restriction cannot be rejected without constant. Impulse and response tests indicate halflives of just one month. Unit value deviations between the two main exporting countries at each month are never greater than 5% or smaller than -5% for two consecutive months over this whole 19-year period. Therefore, we may conclude that unit value differentials tend to zero and the speed of adjustment is very fast indeed.
U.S.A.-JAPAN
Now that we have a good idea of the basic statistics of the monthly series of c.i.f. unit value deviations at the main ports of entry in the U.S. and in Japan, we can compare them with c.i.f. unit value deviations between the U.S. and Japan. cointegrate with the series of Japan and the constant is not significant both with and without the restriction that the coefficients are (1,-1). The hypothesis that the coefficients are (1,-1) has a probability of 79% without a constant. Therefore, we cannot reject that LOP deviations between the U.S. and Japan reverse to a zero-mean. Impulse and response tests indicate that the U.S. response to a one standard deviation shock in Japan has a 3 months half-life, while the half-life response of Japan to the U.S. is just 2 months.
The speed of adjustment is slightly less fast than when we were dealing with the main exporters to just one destination. Nevertheless, the fact that LOP deviations are small (small standard deviations) and not persistent provides strong evidence in favor of the LOP.
If we apply the same econometric procedure to the series of c.i.f. unit values, but considering only the five main exporters to the U.S. and the four main exporters to Japan, we get basically the same results, except that the restriction (1,-1) on the coefficients is rejected without constant but cannot be rejected with constant. The intercept is close to zero (0.005), but is significantly different from zero. LOP deviations reverse to this mean, whose sign indicates that the c.i.f. unit values are lower in the U.S. than in Japan. This result suggests that fringe competitors tend to raise the average of unit values in the U.S. and the dispersion of LOP deviations between the U.S. and Japan. The half-life responses of the U.S. to Japan and vice-versa go down to just two and one month, respectively, when only the main exporters are being considered, suggesting that fringe competitors react more slowly to changes in prices; i.e., arbitrage is less efficient.
Bearing in mind the long distance and significant trade costs between the East and the West sides of the U.S., we have also applied the same econometric procedure to test LOP deviations between BA and Japan and between LA and Japan 20 . We find that LOP deviations reverse to zero-mean between BA and Japan. Japan responds very quickly to price shocks in BA (half-life=1 month), but BA reacts more slowly to shocks in Japan (half-life=4 months). On the other hand, LOP deviations between LA and Japan reverse to a mean (0.015) whose sign indicates that unit values in LA tend to be higher on average than in Japan. But the response of LA to shocks in Japan has a half-life of just 1 month, while the response of Japan to LA has a half-life of 2 months. Therefore, although unit values tend to be higher in LA, the arbitrage mechanism appears to be more efficient between these locations than between BA and Japan whose unit values tend to be the same. It is noteworthy that the standard deviation is much higher for the LOP deviations between LA and Japan than between BA and Japan. This reflects the fact that c.i.f. unit values in LA are much more volatile than in Japan and BA. The small size of the LA market is likely to play a major role in the volatility of unit values there. The large size of the BA import market might be the main reason why Japan responds so fast to changes in unit values in BA, while the much smaller size and lower trade costs might explain why LA responds so fast to Japan. But a more complete explanation has to wait until we examine the arbitrage process and the trade costs on the basis of our arbitrage model later in this section.
U.S. Pairs of Ports
LOP deviations between pairs of the main ports of entry in the United States were also arbitrage is effective and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the arbitrageurs' trade costs are approximately the same to these pairs of destinations. However, whenever LA is one of the destinations, the constant term is always significant and the sign of the intercept indicates that unit values at the port in LA are larger than elsewhere 21 .
Relating unit value differentials to trade costs and market power
U.S. import data allow us to investigate further the arbitrage mechanism among the main ports of entry in that country and to try to relate unit value differentials to trade costs and market power. We take pairs of the major destination ports and calculate the LOP values cannot be rejected for most exporting (arbitrageurs) countries and pairs of destinations, even at the 10% significance level. Therefore, for almost all exporting countries and pairs of destinations, exporters are unable to price discriminate a particular market in a systematic way. The two exceptions are for China, when exporting to LA in 20 The series consider all exporters to each location. Two missing values in the series of unit values of BA were filled with the unit values of NY, while five of LA were filled with those of SF. 21 Large sample non-parametric sign tests confirm that unit values in LA are greater than in BA, NO, SF and NY. They also confirm that the following equalities cannot be rejected: BA=NY, NY=NO, NO=SF, BA=NO, BA=SF, and NY=SF.
comparison with BA and SF. Chinese f.o.b. unit values are higher when exports are to LA than when they are to BA or SF.
Applying the same non-parametric sign test to LOP deviations of c.i.f. unit values between pairs of destinations by exporting country, the hypothesis that LOP deviations have zero medians cannot be rejected for the vast majority of cases. All four exceptions include LA as one of the destinations. This is absolutely consistent with our previous results. C.i.f. unit values are higher in LA than in BA for imports coming from China and Peru. They are also higher in LA than in SF for imports coming from China and are higher in NY than in LA when coming from Indonesia.
We already know that LOP deviations reverse to a zero-mean, when all exporting countries are considered, except when LA is one of the destinations. Non-parametric sign tests confirm that medians of LOP deviations of arbitrageurs are not zero precisely when LA is one of the destinations. Thus, our main task is to try to explain why c.i.f. unit values are higher in LA and approximately the same in the other main destinations.
Baltimore-New Orleans
Peru and Brazil were the main arbitrageurs between BA and NO. Peru exported to BA and NO simultaneously in 117 months, while Brazil did so in 57 months. We already know that equality of c.i.f. unit values between the two main exporters at each month to BA or to NO cannot be rejected. We cannot reject the hypothesis that c.i.f. unit value differentials are zero between Brazil and all the other exporting countries or between Peru and all the other exporting countries both in BA and in NO. We cannot reject the hypothesis that f.o.b. and c.i.f. LOP deviations are zero between these two destinations for imports from Peru and Brazil. Therefore, Peru and Brazil were competitive in both markets and able to check each other's price and take any opportunity for arbitrage. Thus, we find no evidence of market power by exporters or shippers from Brazil and Peru in either BA or NO.
Our model predicts that c.i.f. price differentials between these two destinations should be equal to the ad valorem trade cost differentials of the arbitrageurs between these two locations. In fact, ad valorem trade costs are relatively small in proportion to import unit values (log tm=log c.i.f.-log f.o.b.) 22 . As a result, trade cost differentials between pairs of destinations in the U.S. from any particular exporting country (log tmilog tmj) are almost always negligible 23 . Thus, LOP deviations tend to be approximately zero between BA and NO and are never persistently large.
Equation (6) The positive and close to one coefficient of the trade cost differential variable is consistent with our theoretical expectation for competitive markets.
Baltimore-Los Angeles
Indonesia, China and Peru were the largest and most frequent exporters to LA. Thus, LA has largely been supplied by Asian exporters, but Peru has been the main connection between NO and LA, supplying these two markets within the same month for 71 months.
Exporters of Peru do not seem to be able to systematically price discriminate these two markets, as indicated by the non-parametric confidence interval for the median of f.o.b.
LOP deviations. On the other hand, Chinese f.o.b. unit values are often higher for exports 22 Ad valorem trade costs vary from one to three percent and ad valorem trade cost differentials are around 0.3% when LA is not one of the destinations. 23 Peru's trade cost differentials between BA and NO, for example, have median, mean and standard deviations equal to (-0.0016;-0.0018;0.0048) . 24 Since the dispersion of unit value differentials increases as exported quantities by country decline, an attempt was made to correct for heteroscedasticity by dividing both the dependent and the independent variables by the exponential of log( 5x10 6 )-log(q m ), where q m is the total quantity exported by the arbitrageur to the two destinations and 5x10 6 is the monthly quantity average exported by the main countries to BA in the 19-year period. This yields a clear improvement in the precision of the regression coefficients, since there is a decline in the standard errors.
to LA than to SF or BA. China's c.i.f. unit values are also higher in LA compared to SF or BA. Peru's c.i.f. unit values are higher in LA than in BA too 25 .
There are three possible non-excludent explanations for China's f.o.b. unit values to LA being higher than to other destinations: differences in shipping time from China to these locations lead to prices being settled at different moments in time; the quality of Chinese tin is higher when exported to LA than to the other destinations; and Chinese exporters have market power and can price discriminate for a significant period of time.
The first hypothesis is hard to believe since the routes and distances from China to LA and SF are about the same, and China's trade costs to LA are on average lower than to SF and to BA, eliminating the possibility of LA being a time-consuming and expensive port. Therefore, in the case of Peru, it is the shipping service between Peru and LA that is able to exert market power and benefit from higher prices in LA.
It is interesting to note that Indonesia and China very often exported simultaneously to LA and BA. Given that trade costs from these exporters to LA are much lower than to BA, one could expect prices in BA to be higher than in LA. The opposite is true, because Peru, Bolivia and Brazil lead exports to BA, cutting prices there. If these markets were competitive and the conditions for equation (1) We note that the intercept is significant, reinforcing our conclusion that exporters from
China exercise market power in LA. The coefficient of the trade cost differential variable is negative, since the trade cost from China to LA is smaller than to BA. Shipping time does not seem to help explaining lop deviations. Our attempts to correct for heteroscedasticity have not changed the above results in any significant way.
Concluding Remarks
The multi-country arbitrage model developed in this article shows that, to properly test the LOP and examine the link between relative prices and trade costs, one has to be able to identify who and where the arbitrageurs are, so as to find which trade costs are relevant to price differentials.
LOP deviations between the U.S. and Japan have proved to be very small, reverse to a zero-mean and were never persistently larger than their standard deviation. In fact, the adjustment speeds we find between spatially separated markets are much faster than have previously been found in the literature, both intra-nationally and internationally.
These results provide strong support for the LOP in the tin trade and confirm empirically the limited relevance of Heckscher's commodity points in understanding the link between trade costs and price differentials. Our results also indicate that fringe competitors in the U.S. and in Japan tend to raise deviations and slow down price convergence, making the arbitrage mechanism less efficient. Therefore, although competition (more competitors) tends to help to integrate markets, the presence of small competitors (small quantities and low frequency) may delay the arbitrage mechanism between spatially separated markets.
LOP deviations between pairs of the main ports in the U.S. are larger than between the U.S. and Japan. Therefore, there is no border effect in the tin trade between the U.S.
and Japan, regardless of the behavior of exchange rates. This suggests that, without border-related trade barriers, local distributional costs and product differentiation, the border effect may vanish.
We find evidence that market power by exporters of China and by shipping services from Peru to LA explains some large LOP deviations between LA and other destinations in the U.S. Indeed, our theoretical model predicts that China would not sell to a lower price market such as BA where trade cost is higher than to LA, if the higher price market (LA) were competitive. The fact that it does must imply that the LA market is not competitive. 
